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VALUING AUTONOMY
Youngjae Lee*
INTRODUCTION

In Securing Constitutional Democracy,l James Fleming elaborates a
theory of the Constitution that "firmly connects privacy or autonomy to the
substance and structures of constitutional democracy." 2 Through what he
calls "constitutional constructivism," Fleming makes a forceful argument
that "deliberative autonomy is rooted... in the language and overall design
of the Constitution" and that deliberative autonomy, along with
"deliberative democracy," has "a structural role to play in securing and
3
fostering our constitutional democracy."
In explaining the place of "deliberative autonomy" in the Constitution,
Fleming provides the following list:
liberty of conscience and freedom of thought
freedom of association, including both expressive association and intimate
association, whatever one's sexual orientation
the right to live with one's family, whether nuclear or extended
the right to travel or relocate
the right to decide whether to bear or beget children, including the rights
to procreate, to use contraceptives, and to terminate a pregnancy
the right to direct the education and rearing of children
the right to exercise dominion over one's body, including the right to
4
bodily integrity and ultimately the right to die.
Fleming points out two features of this list of rights. First, they are
"fundamental rights" most of which the "Supreme Court has recognized...
under the categories of privacy, autonomy, or substantive due process." 5
Second, these rights "reserve to persons the power to deliberate about and
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
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decide how to live their own lives, with respect to certain matters unusually
important for such personal self-governance, over the course of a complete
life (from cradle to grave)."'6 In other words, these are "basic liberties that
are significant preconditions for persons' development and exercise of
deliberative autonomy in making certain fundamental decisions affecting
'7
their destiny, identity, or way of life, and spanning a complete lifetime."
There is much to say about this rich book, in particular about the idea of
deliberative autonomy and about Fleming's explication of its role in our
constitutional law. In this essay, I limit my remarks to two questions. First,
if Fleming is right that autonomy is a core value that must be protected to
"secure constitutional democracy," how should we make sense of our
criminal justice system as a constitutional matter?
Second, in
understanding the scope of deliberative autonomy in constitutional law,
does it make sense to see the Constitution, as Fleming does, as protecting
"preconditions for persons' development and exercise of deliberative
autonomy"? Or, should we think of the Constitution as going beyond
protecting preconditions for exercise of autonomy and, in fact, making
substantive judgments about what types of exercises of autonomy are worth
protecting?
I. AUTONOMY, PUNISHMENT, AND THE CONSTITUTION

Given that autonomy is the central idea driving Fleming's book, there is a
glaring, if not surprising, omission in the book-the topic of the
constitutional status of the institution of punishment. 8 Fleming's list of
basic liberties protected by the Constitution appears accurate so long as we
focus on law-abiding citizens. When we shift the focus to convicted
persons, the picture of basic liberties looks very different. We routinely
send people to prisons in this country for five, fifteen, twenty-five years, or
for life. Sometimes we even kill them. According to the latest figures, a
record seven million Americans (one in every thirty-two adults) were
behind bars, on probation, or on parole at the end of 2005, and, of those, 2.2
million were in prison or jail.9
For most people, even spending just a three-month period in prison away
from their work, friends, and families, would be a highly traumatizing,
disruptive experience. Sentences significantly longer than that are nothing
less than personal catastrophes for those convicted. And it is none other
than the government, representing us, that brings about such catastrophes as
a matter of routine and in the name of upholding the rule of law. If Fleming
is right that autonomy is a core constitutional value necessary for securing

6. Id. at 93.
7. Id.
8. The omission is not surprising because the same omission is typical in most works of
constitutional theory.
9. A Record Seven Million Americans in Justice System, Int'l Herald Trib., Nov. 30,
2006, availableat http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/11/30/news/prison.php.
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constitutional democracy, we have some explaining to do about our
criminal justice system as a constitutional matter.
So what would a theory of criminal law constructed within Fleming's
framework look like? There are some hints as to how such a theory would
develop when Fleming
argues that the nature of the Constitution is
"essentially positive"'0 in that it imposes "affirmative obligations to secure
the preconditions for constitutional democracy.""I Fleming suggests that
we think about the Constitution as "first and foremost a charter of ends,
goods, or benefits like national security."' 12
When discussing the
relationship of his conception of autonomy and the feminist critique of
autonomy, Fleming stresses that "the protection of basic liberties includes
protecting individuals not only from the government, but also from each
other."13
The basic argument for an autonomy-promoting criminal justice system
may be derived from these insights. As we can see from post-invasion Iraq,
it is impossible to get a democratic government going if there is first no
guarantee of basic physical safety of citizens. By removing Saddam
Hussein from power, the American-led invasion may have eliminated one
source of threats to Iraqis' basic liberties, but, by sparking disorder and
internecine conflict, it has enabled the proliferation of another source of
threats to basic liberties. In other words, deliberative autonomy may face
threats from two directions, public and private. Cases like Lawrence v.
Texas 14 highlight threats to individual autonomy by the government, but
autonomy can face threats from murderers, rapists, and thugs as well. If I
am constantly worried about being physically attacked by those who seek to
harm me, it would be very difficult for me to carry on a life that could be
called autonomous in any meaningful sense.1 5 The Constitution may thus
be thought of as a means to prevent the war of all against all and to bring
16
about "domestic tranquility and the blessings of liberty."'
Could we, then, make sense of our denial of basic liberties to criminals as
part of this design? Fleming writes about how it may be necessary to
violate the Constitution in order to save it-the way Lincoln suspended the
17
writ of habeas corpus during the Civil War in order to save the Union.
Similarly, perhaps the criminal justice system could be thought of as
everyday restrictions on the basic liberties of certain groups of people that
are necessary in order to secure constitutional democracy. What this line of
thinking suggests is a balancing framework that makes autonomy versus

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
(1651).
16.
17.

Fleming, supra note 1, at 208.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 139.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 183-88 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Books 1968)
Fleming, supra note 1, at 196.
Id. at 200-01.
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autonomy determinations between the autonomy of offenders and the
autonomy of everyone else. Every time the government steps in to punish a
criminal, it interferes with the offender's autonomy by taking his liberties
away, but at the same time, the government maintains a broader system of
crime prevention that is necessary to protect people's autonomy from being
curtailed by their fellow citizens. The question then is how the balancing is
to be done.
Some of the balancing has already been done by the framers of the
Constitution, as the Constitution places various limits on the government's
power to criminalize and to punish. The Constitution makes some of the
limiting principles explicit in the Due Process Clause 18 (here, I mean
procedural, not substantive), Double Jeopardy Clause, 19 Confrontation
Clause, 20 Self-incrimination Clause, 2 1 the right to dounsel, 22 the jury trial
guarantee, 23 and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 24 The
Constitution also has implicit limiting principles in the form of fundamental
rights, such as freedom of expression and various liberties recognized under
substantive due process. As opposed to provisions that are explicitly
designed as criminal procedure provisions, these are implicit limitations on
criminal law, as one of the implications of calling something a
"fundamental right" is that the government cannot prohibit a person's
exercise of it by criminalizing it. Regulation of these fundamental rights
through means other than criminal prohibitions may be unconstitutional as
well, but criminal law is one of the bluntest and most powerful instruments
the government has at its disposal to regulate society.
The Constitution therefore constrains criminal law in two ways-it takes
certain things off the list of things that the government may criminalize, and
it imposes various restrictions on how the government may go about
enforcing the criminal law. 25 One might summarize the current state of
constitutional restrictions on criminal law in the following way:
1.
Do not criminalize A, B, and C... (A, B, and C... being
exercises of fundamental rights).
2.

So long as fundamental rights are not inhibited, the government
may criminalize any conduct 26-from speeding to murder-as
the government sees fit.

18. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
19. Id. amend. V.
20. Id. amend. VI.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. amend. VIII.
25. I ignore various doctrines associated with the principle of legality in this essay. See
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law"); id. § 10; City of Chicago
v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (vagueness).
26. The "conduct" requirement is minimal. See generally Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514

(1968).
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When the government enforces criminal law (enacted within
constraints 1 and 2), it must do so without violating constraints
X, Y, Z... (i.e., constraints relating to search and seizure, right
to counsel, trial by jury, confrontation of witnesses, cruel and
unusual punishments, etc.)

Autonomy is rightly taken very seriously when it comes to fundamental
rights. But what about conduct that lies outside the scope of fundamental
rights (those covered under constraint 2)? It cannot be the case that our
concern for autonomy is entirely suspended once we step outside the
narrow world of fundamental rights. Neither do procedural rules (those
referred to in constraint 3) provide sufficient safeguards for autonomy. If a
government passes a law that prohibits eating cheeseburgers near
elementary schools as a way of dealing with obesity, as long as the crime is
defined in a way that does not interfere with constitutionally recognized
fundamental rights, the government is free to punish a person after proving
beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury that he ate a cheeseburger in front of an
elementary school. Even the most aggressive interpretation of Apprendi v.
New Jersey27 could not prevent such an outcome. 28 This state of affairs
should be highly disturbing to anyone who cares about interpreting the
Constitution as an autonomy-protecting instrument, considering the degree
29
of liberty deprivation that criminalization permits.
A truly autonomy-respecting constitution would require different ground
rules for criminal law than what the current case law provides. Here are a
few different ways of going about it:
Autonomy Theory A
IA. Do not criminalize A, B, and C... (A, B, and C... being exercises
of fundamental rights) unless doing so would maximize autonomy (or
minimize violations of autonomy).
2A. When regulating behaviors that do not fall within the scope of
exercises of fundamental rights, use criminal law only when it is the option
that maximizes autonomy (or minimizes violations of autonomy).
3A. When the government enforces criminal law (enacted within
constraints IA and 2A), it must do so while observing procedural rules that
maximize autonomy (or minimize violations of autonomy).
27. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
28. One might try a Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause violation as an argument,
but unless we are talking about the death penalty, it is very difficult to get the Court to pay
attention. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003). The only other option may be jury
nullification-a highly unreliable, unpredictable, and uncalibrated safety valve that we do
not even like mentioning as an option to juries. For a recent bibliography of writings on the
jury nullification controversy, see Teresa L. Conaway et al., Jury Nullification: A Selective,
Annotated Bibliography,39 Val. U. L. Rev. 393 (2004).
29. This oddity has been noted by many. See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from
Incarceration: Why Is This Right Differentfrom All Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 781
(1994); Alice Ristroph, Proportionalityas a Principleof Limited Government, 55 Duke L.J.

263, 328 (2005).
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Autonomy Theory B
lB. Do not criminalize A, B, and C... (A, B, and C... being exercises
of fundamental rights).
2B. When regulating behaviors that do not fall within the scope of
exercises of fundamental rights, use criminal law only as last resort. 30 The
government has many regulatory tools, and the total deprivation of physical
liberty that accompanies imprisonment should be used only when it is
necessary. This means, among other things, that the government should
attempt to protect the value of autonomy by devising various "alternative
sanctions" that restrict offenders' autonomy only to the extent that it is
necessary, and that if imprisonment is the only option that makes sense for
certain offenders, the government should not hold them in prisons for
longer than it is necessary.
3B. When the government enforces criminal law (enacted within
constraints lB and 2B), it must do so without violating constraints X, Y,
Z... (i.e., search and seizure, right to counsel, trial by jury, confrontation
of witnesses, cruel and unusual punishments, etc.).
We can also mix and match and produce, say, the following
configuration:
Autonomy Theory AB
lB. Do not criminalize A, B, and C... (A, B, and C... being exercises
of fundamental rights).
2A. When regulating behaviors that do not fall within the scope of
exercises of fundamental rights, use criminal law only when it is the option
that maximizes autonomy (or minimizes violations of autonomy).
3B. When the government enforces criminal law (enacted within
constraints 11B and 2A), it must do so without violating constraints X, Y,
Z... (i.e., search and seizure, right to counsel, trial by jury, confrontation
of witnesses, cruel and unusual punishments, etc.).
Borrowing from Nozick, Autonomy Theory A may be called a
"utilitarian of rights" view, and Autonomy Theory B a "side constraints"
view. 31 Autonomy Theory AB is a two-tier system: side constraints for
30. Some scholars have suggested limits on criminalization along these lines. See
generally Douglas Husak, The Criminal Law as Last Resort, 24 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 207
(2004); Nils Jareborg, Criminalizationas Last Resort (Ultima Ratio), 2 Ohio St. J. Crim. L.
521 (2005).
31. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 30 (1974).

Although Autonomy Theory

B allows trade-offs and balancing (through narrow-tailoring principles, as in constraint 2B),
that does not necessarily make the label "side constraints" inaccurate. It is true that
Nozickian theories of rights are commonly thought to require something like "absolute
rights," but that is not the only version of the "side constraints" notion. One might also have
a "stringency or resistance to trade-offs" view that does not degenerate into the "utilitarian of
rights" view. See Youngjae Lee, The ConstitutionalRight Against Excessive Punishment, 91
Va. L. Rev. 677, 708 n. 147 (2005). Nozick himself left this question largely unexplored. See
Nozick, supra at 30.
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fundamental liberties and procedural guarantees but "utilitarian of rights"
when it comes to criminalization and punishment issues that do not involve
criminalizing exercises of "fundamental rights."
For the purposes of this essay, I make three points about these
frameworks. First, stressing the value of autonomy by itself cannot tell us
which framework is the correct one, and it does not seem that any one of
them conflicts with Fleming's constitutional theory. There is no question
that there is a deontological flavor to Fleming's theory (especially in his
discussions of deliberative democracy and its relationship to equality and
the Dworkinian idea of equal concern and respect) that makes Autonomy
Theory B more Fleming-esque than Autonomy Theory A. However, the
constitutional status of those convicted of crimes in Fleming's theory is not
clear-unless the law that authorizes their convictions criminalizes an
exercise of a fundamental liberty. One relevant statement I found is
Fleming's observation that "when the Constitution is suspended, the
executive has restorative obligations, affirmative obligations to work
actively toward restoring conditions in which the Constitution can function
as law." 32 Analogously, the government may have an ongoing duty to
minimize deprivations of liberty, but that sentiment, too, is compatible with
all of the frameworks proposed above.
Second, valuing autonomy does not necessarily lead to more robust
protections of constitutional rights when dealing with rights of private
actors who threaten autonomy interests of others. Autonomy Theory A has
no qualms about violating the autonomy of certain individuals if such
violations can bring greater returns in terms of autonomy overall. Although
its "utilitarian" (or aggregative) feature might make the theory vulnerable in
many ways, it does not have the weaknesses of some of the more crude
versions of utilitarianism that justify, say, torturing an individual if a
sufficient number of people derive amusement from it, since the theory is
firmly rooted in the value of autonomy. For instance, the "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt" rule can be weakened under this theory although it is
currently a constitutional requirement. 33 The "reasonable doubt" rule is,
after all, not explicitly required by the text of the Constitution, and the
autonomy-maximizing strategy may counsel us to relax the standard of
proof when we are dealing with particularly dangerous people or serious
by Cass Sunstein and
crimes. 34 A recent defense of the death penalty
35
Adrian Vermeule is an argument of this sort.
Finally, none of the proposed sets of principles is even close to our
present-day constitutional jurisprudence. These principles are so far from
32. Fleming, supra note 1, at 207.
33. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970).

34. For a more general discussion of the possibility of adjusting levels of constitutional
protection of criminal defendants according to the seriousness of crimes, see Eugene Volokh,
Crime Severity and ConstitutionalLine-Drawing,90 Va. L. Rev. 1957 (2004).
35. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?
Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 703 (2005).
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the current practice and mainstream constitutional scholarship that they may
even be called utopian. Some combination of the ban on cruel and unusual
punishments and substantive due process doctrines can probably be used to
generate these rules, but that seems very unlikely to happen any time soon.
The question is how this can be, why it is that we do not experience this
state of affairs as a national scandal with a constitutional dimension-or in
Fleming's terms, a "constitutional tragedy" 36 -and whether we should be
more troubled about it-as a constitutional problem, not just as a policy
problem-than we currently are. 37 The ultimate solution to this puzzle will
have to take the form of rationalization of the status quo and some
proposals for reform, and I merely offer the puzzle as a challenge to
constitutional theorists, especially those who are sympathetic to Fleming's
theory.
II. AUTONOMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW THICK AND THIN
As Fleming recognizes, any theory that places a value as abstract and
potentially expansive as autonomy in the Constitution must confront the
38
question of "the meaning, scope, and constitutional status" of the right.
An instructive discussion for the purposes of understanding the way
Fleming resolves this issue can be found in chapter seven of the book where
he contrasts his approach against that of Michael Sandel. 39 To illustrate the
difference between the approaches, Fleming focuses on the issue that
Lawrence v. Texas decided: criminalization of homosexual sodomy.
For Fleming, Lawrence is an easy case, as criminalization of homosexual
sodomy is a clear violation of the right to autonomy. Sandel, on the other
hand, would justify cases like Lawrence in different terms. 40 As Fleming
puts it, Sandel would say that the Lawrence Court "should have justified
protecting homosexuals' right to privacy not on the basis of homosexuals'
freedom to make personal choices, but on the ground of the goods or virtues

36. Fleming, supra note 1, at 220.
37. It is not easy to explain away the Court's lack of attention to autonomy interests of
criminals as a legitimate form of judicial underenforcement. When it comes to economic
liberties, Fleming finds judicial underenforcement to be appropriate given that economic
liberties "can and do fend well enough for themselves in the political process." Id. at 136.
That argument does not apply in the criminal context. As many have argued, interests of
criminal defendants are underrepresented in our political process, and representationreinforcing arguments for aggressive judicial interventions seem particularly appropriate in
this context. William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J.
Contemp. Legal Issues 1, 20 (1996). Some have argued that the fact that punishment is
expensive and that state budgets are limited can compensate for criminal defendants' lack of
representation. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105
Colum. L. Rev. 1276 (2005). Such economy-based arguments, however, have troubling
implications that need to be thought through carefully. See Emily Bazelon, Sentencing by the
Numbers, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 18.
38. Fleming, supra note 1, at 1.
39. See id. at 141-71.
40. Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public
Philosophy 103-08 (1996).
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fostered by homosexuals' intimate associations." 41 Sandel's approach
would require us to make distinctions between good choices and bad
choices, good associations and bad associations, and good activities and bad
activities. The reason to protect homosexual intimate associations is not
because homosexuals' autonomy should be protected, according to Sandel,
but because such associations
promote "important human goods" that the
42
government should foster.
Fleming makes a number of criticisms of Sandel's approach. First,
Sandel does not value autonomy enough by "reject[ing] . . . the moral

principle of autonomy and its value" and "exclu[ding] ... such autonomy
from his conception of self-government. '4 3 Second, liberals that Sandel
criticizes in fact take human goods and virtues more seriously than Sandel
suggests that they do. That is, according to Fleming, Sandel exaggerates
the difference between his own theory and theories of liberals like Fleming
himself and Dworkin and statements found in various Supreme Court
opinions.44 In short, it is not that Sandel's theory is "too thick" but that (1)
it is "too thin" in parts that matter (in its failure to recognize the value of
choice), and that (2) liberals' theories are "thicker" than Sandel portrays.
Fleming's discussion of Sandel pushes Fleming away from his "thin"
conception of autonomy and towards what he calls "thicker" conceptions of
autonomy, 45 such as that of Joseph Raz. 46 Raz occupies the space between
Sandel and Fleming in that he values autonomy but says that autonomy is
"valuable only if it is directed at the good" and "does not extend to the
morally bad and repugnant."'47 Fleming says such thick theories are
"compatible with, and have affinities to" his own model, but he at the same
time seems reluctant to embrace it as part of his theory. 48 Given Fleming's
persuasive criticism that Sandel's own theory may not be generous enough
to recognize liberals' emphasis on virtues and also not liberal enough in its
lack of emphasis on autonomy, perhaps a more interesting and instructive
question to ask is why it is that Fleming shies away from what he calls the
"thicker" theories of autonomy.
One clue to this question is indicated in another argument that Fleming
makes against Sandel, which is that "Sandel's civic republicanism is too
thick."'4 9 He says that Sandel underestimates the depth and persistence of
moral disagreements surrounding cases like Lawrence. The kinds of
conversations about values of homosexual intimate relations that Sandel
wants us to engage in, Fleming thinks, are too controversial and too risky in

41. Fleming, supra note 1, at 141.

42.
43.
44.
45.

Sandel, supra note 40, at 104.
Fleming, supra note 1, at 149.
Id. at 148-51.
Id. at 99.

46. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (1986).

47. Id. at 411; see also id. at 378-81 (discussing autonomy and value).
48. Fleming, supra note 1, at 99.
49. Id. at 142, 151-53.
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terms of inviting intolerant viewpoints into the public sphere. Fleming
appears to be concerned that encouraging a substantive moral conversation
in public legislative and judicial fora would open a can of worms that we
may have trouble containing in the end. It is far better, Fleming argues, to
conduct the debate in terms of autonomy and its value, as opposed to how
autonomy is used to promote other human goods. He thus concludes that
"[i]n some cases of persistent moral conflict, liberal toleration is a necessary
starting point and may even be the most that can be achieved. ' 50
Presumably, similar arguments could be made against attempts to bring
"thicker" theories of autonomy such as Raz's to bear on constitutional law.
The question I want to explore is whether Fleming can successfully stay
at his preferred level of "thickness" in defending autonomy and interpret the
Constitution as not engaging in substantive evaluations of people's choices,
about lives well and poorly lived, freedoms well and poorly exercised.
Let me begin my discussion here with the gruesome case of Armin
Meiwes, who was recently convicted of murder and sentenced to life in
Germany. 5 1 Meiwes was no ordinary murderer; he was also a cannibal.
Meiwes, a computer technician in his forties, posted an ad on the Internet in
2000, looking for men to be killed and eaten by him. 52 The ad stated that
he was "seeking well-built man, 18-30 years old, for slaughter. '53 Meiwes
testified that more than 200 people answered his ad. 54 A detective testified
that there was, in fact, a large cannibal scene in Germany involving "people
who come from the middle reaches of society," including "dentists,
teachers, cooks, government officials, and handymen. '5 5 Not all of these
people wanted to be eaten. Five people actually traveled to meet Meiwes in
his home in Rotenberg, to discuss the act of being killed and eaten. One of
these visitors, Jorg Bose, a thirty-four year old cook, let Meiwes hang him
from the ceiling to be killed, but changed his mind and backed out. Dirk
Moller, a twenty-seven year old hotel worker, was another would-be victim,
and although he went as far as being chained to a bed and marked for
butchery, he, too, backed out after seeing a video of Bose hanging from the
ceiling. 56 Apparently, once these people withdrew their consent, they were
able to leave unharmed--each instance simply turning into a relationship
that did not work out because the parties involved wanted different things
from each other.

50. Id. at 153.
51. Luke Harding, German Court Finds Cannibal Guilty of Murder, Guardian (London),
May 10, 2006, at A3.
52. Peter Finn, CannibalCase Grips Germany, Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 2003, at A26.
53. Id.
54. Jeffrey Fleishman, Germans Get a Look at Dark Side of Cyberspace, L.A. Times,

Dec. 31, 2003, at A3.
55. Luke Harding, Dentists and Teachers Part of Vast Cannibal Scene, Court Told,

Guardian (London), Dec. 9, 2003, at 13; see also Ben Aris, Cannibalism Trial Told of
Suspected New Cases, Guardian (London), Jan. 6, 2004, at 14.
56. Kate Connolly, I Asked Cannibal To Eat Me, Says Would-Be Victim, Daily
Telegraph (London), Dec. 16, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 4237778.
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The only one, as far as we know, who went through the act of being
killed by Meiwes was Bemd-Juergen Brandes, a forty-three year old
engineer for Siemens in Berlin. 57 It appears that Brandes had a desire to be
sexually mutilated and had talked about this to a former boyfriend, but the
former boyfriend testified that Brandes did not otherwise show any signs of
depression or suicidal tendencies. 58 One ex-girlfriend also testified that
there was nothing outwardly wrong with Brandes and that he had in fact
been "an easygoing, domestic type." 59 After answering Meiwes's ad,
Brandes corresponded with Meiwes over email for several weeks. The
email messages explicitly discussed cannibalistic acts in detail and in a
sexually charged manner. 60 Brandes traveled to Rotenberg to meet Meiwes
in March, and on the evening of March 9, 2001, Meiwes stabbed Brandes to
death in his home and carved him up. 6 1 Brandes's body was kept in a
freezer, and Meiwes ate much of it over the next several months. The act of
killing itself was videotaped, and, apparently, the video, lasting four and a
half hours, shows that the victim willingly gave his consent to be killed and
eaten. 62 Meiwes, who declared in court that he believed "everyone should
be able to decide what he wants to do with his own body," was convicted of
murder in May 2006.63

Consent is no defense to homicide. 64 For most of us, it would not be
considered a serious violation of sexual autonomy or the right to die for the
government to fail to make the consent defense available in cases like the
Meiwes case. If Meiwes was facing charges for murder in the United States
and he raised a constitutional argument against the prosecution citing
Lawrence, his constitutional argument would not go very far. The doctrinal
argument is simple. In Lawrence, the Court was very clear in outlining
limits to its holding when it said, "The present case does not involve
minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or
who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused.
It does not involve public conduct or prostitution." 6 5 The Meiwes case does
not involve minors. It appears that there was no coercion here, judging
from the e-mail exchanges between Meiwes and Brandes, the video, and
57. Tony Paterson, Cannibal Says He Was Lonely and Dreamt of 'Brother' to
Disembowel, Independent (London), Dec. 4, 2003, at 15.
58. No Death Wish for Cannibal Victim, Australian, Jan. 14, 2004, available at 2004
WLNR 7582367; Tony Paterson, Cannibal's Victim Was Obsessed with Sexual Mutilation,
Independent (London), Jan. 13, 2004, at 12.
59. No Death Wish for Cannibal Victim, supra note 58.
60. Ben Aris, Self-Confessed Cannibal Is Ruled Sane by Psychiatrist, Guardian
(London), Dec. 30, 2003, 14; Roger Boyes, Cannibalism Fantasy E-mails Sicken Court,
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evidence that several people who traveled to see Meiwes for the purpose of
being killed were able to leave unharmed once they decided to withhold
their consent. The act of killing and eating took place in the privacy of
Meiwes's own home. The Meiwes case, therefore, cannot be distinguished
on those grounds. Rather, the key distinction here is that there is obviously
a serious physical injury in this case.
Therefore, as a doctrinal matter, there may not be a difficult issue here.
Due to the narrowness of the ruling, the Supreme Court need not worry
about having to grant someone like Meiwes a constitutionally mandated
defense of "consent of victim." However, the issue is not so simple for a
theorist committed to autonomy like Fleming.
His approach of
"[c]onstitutional constructivism," while "draw[ing] . . . from our
constitutional democracy's ongoing practice, tradition, and culture," is not
merely interpretive but also normative. 66 The principles that he extracts
from our constitutional practice are "aspirational," and "they enable us to
criticize some of those practices for failing to live up to our constitutional
commitments." 67 Thus, he considers the Court's refusal to acknowledge
the right to die in Washington v. Glucksberg68 to be mistaken. 69 The
question for Fleming, who presumably would not recognize convicting
Meiwes as a constitutional violation, is why the seeming restriction of both
sexual autonomy and the right to die, both rights recognized by Fleming as
fundamental rights necessary for securing preconditions for constitutional
democracy, is not thought to be constitutionally problematic. I am not
making the cultural conservative argument that a case like Lawrence would
lead to constitutional protection of "adult incest, prostitution, masturbation,
adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity. '70 The question, rather, is
why Lawrence was correctly decided and what kinds of arguments surface
when we try to articulate a distinction between Lawrence and the
hypothetical constitutional challenge brought by Meiwes.
How would a case like this be analyzed under Fleming's framework? I
will focus on the victim's right since the claim would be that it is his right
to sexual autonomy and right to die that would be violated by the
unavailability of the consent defense in the Meiwes case. Drawing from
Rawls, Fleming stresses persons' "capacity for a conception of the good"
and builds his case for deliberative autonomy on such capacity. 7 1 He
elaborates that "a conception of the good is a conception of what is valuable
in human life" and that "liberty of conscience and freedom of association
enable citizens to exercise . . . their capacity for a conception of the
good.., in forming, revising, and rationally pursuing their conceptions of
the good, individually and in association with others, over the course of a
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Fleming, supra note 1, at 6.
Id.
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
Fleming, supra note 1, at 221-24.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Fleming, supra note 1, at 68.
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complete life-that is, to apply their power of deliberative reason in
' 72
deciding how to live their own lives."
One option that Fleming has is to bite the bullet and argue that a consent
defense should be a constitutional requirement in a case like this in order to
protect the value of deliberative autonomy. But that is only one of several
options that Fleming has available; there are at least four other options.
First, deny that the right to be killed and eaten is included in his conception
of basic liberties. Second, deny that a genuine, voluntary consent in a case
like this is possible. Third, allow some level of paternalism. Fourth, stress
the "constructivist" character of his theory to reject proposals that sound too
radical or too dissonant with our existing constitutional practice. I will
examine each in turn.
First, perhaps the right to be killed and eaten is not significant enough to
be protected as a basic liberty. Fleming stresses that his conception of
autonomy extends only to "significant basic liberties" and denies that he is
interested in a general "right to be different" or "a right to wear one's hair
as long as one pleases."' 73 However, it is not obvious why the right to be
killed and'eaten should be dismissed as one of those insignificant liberties.
Freedom of association, "including both expressive association and intimate
association," and "the right to exercise dominion over one's body, including
the right to bodily integrity and ultimately the right to die" are at stake in
the cannibalism case. 74 The right to die, of course, means the right to
choose the time and manner of one's own death. As the Court that tried the
Meiwes case stated at one point, Brandes and Meiwes were "looking for the
ultimate kick."' 75 Brandes's desire to satisfy his longing to be eaten in this
way may be a particularly perverse way in which these liberties are being
exercised, but, the point of our respect for autonomy is to avoid making
judgments about people's decisions on such matters. Just as, as Fleming
points out, one's right to vote may be exercised poorly by a thoughtless
individual, 76 one's freedom of association and right to die may be exercised
in a disastrous manner, but that should not threaten our commitment to
leaving that decision to each individual.
Second, Fleming might question whether Brandes actually made a fully
voluntary, informed choice that deserves our respect. Perhaps Brandes
showed signs of a psychiatric disorder. Maybe no one "in his right mind"
would enter into the kind of agreement that Brandes entered into. . There
may be additional evidentiary problems as to whether he did give his full
consent to be killed and eaten. But along all those dimensions, it seems that
the case is not obviously problematic. Brandes was an educated adult in his
early forties, seemingly living a normal, adult life with a job as an engineer
72. Id.

73. Id. at 133.
74. Id. at 92.
75. Mark Landler, German Court Convicts Internet Cannibal of Manslaughter, N.Y.

Times, Jan. 31, 2004, at A3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Fleming, supra note 1, at 159-60.
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for Siemens. There was a videotape that appeared to show that he was
making a voluntary decision. There were no other signs of coercion. If the
question is whether there is genuine consent in cases like this, we could
regulate it so that consent is a defense only when there is full legal
representation by all parties involved, there is a contract laying out exactly
what will happen during the ritual, a clear exit option is provided, and so
on. Unless we can get some independent verification from an expert that
Brandes might have been insane, it seems that we cannot apply a reasonable
person test here and say that Brandes could not possibly have been
reasonable when he entered into this agreement. That would be a failure to
respect his autonomy with autonomy-restricting consequences for other
sane people with idiosyncratic desires.
Third, Fleming makes room in his theory for "certain commonplace,
minimal forms of paternalism" 77 and gives some hints as to what he means
by "minimal" when he says that "a constitutional democracy dedicated to
securing deliberative autonomy might adopt many legislative measures
aimed at preventing or discouraging persons from "'destroying those basic
rational capacities that make them moral beings worthy of respect.' "78 The
reason this sort of paternalism is limited is because it is directed at fostering
autonomy-promoting capacities but not directed at regulating how such
capacities are exercised. But once we recognize the right to die as one of
the basic liberties, it is unclear to me how that distinction can be sustained.
Drug regulations may be justified on the "minimal" paternalist ground that
certain drugs can have the effect of permanently destroying rational
capacities, but, if that is the case, why allow the right to die, which appears
to be the ultimate permanent destruction of capacities, rational or
otherwise? And once we let the right to die in as a fundamental right, why
not require the government to recognize consent as a defense in cases like
the German cannibalism case?
Fourth, Fleming says that his framework "is a theory of constructing our
Constitution, not one that is perfectly just" and that it, accordingly, "draws
our principles and rights from our constitutional democracy's ongoing
practice, tradition, and culture." 79 What this means is that there is a built-in
safeguard to prevent the theory from running wild and uprooting
established practices left and right. This is why Fleming says that no
general argument against paternalistic practices (at least the ones he
Murderconsiders "minimal") can be squared with our practice. 80
cannibalism cases then might not raise a problem for Fleming since
allowing the consent defense in such cases would be a radical departure
The puzzle here is how this built-in
from our current practices.
conservatism as a limiting principle works. Is it not the case then, that
77. Id. at 136.
78. Id. (quoting Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community
in Liberal Constitutionalism 209 (1990)).
79. Id. at 6.
80. See id. at 136.
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whether the theory recommends one course or another will then depend on
whether the conservatism switch is on or off at crucial moments? It seems
that whatever aspirational, normative force the ideal of deliberative
autonomy can muster-which is one of the most attractive features of
Fleming's theory-can be shut off depending on how we characterize "our
constitutional democracy's ongoing practice, tradition, and culture."'8 1 And
if our ongoing practice, tradition, and culture is that criminal defendants'
interests are not represented in the democratic process, and that the
judiciary generally stays out of criminalization and punishment questions
and lets the democratic process take care of things, then would the theory
recommend that we stay silent about the status quo, too?
The point of this exercise is not to show that there is some knock-down
argument against Fleming's framework. In fact, what this discussion shows
is that a theory as rich and nuanced as Fleming's has many conceptual
resources to handle difficult cases. At the same time, I think the discussion
also shows how complex and, at times, awkward, it is to limit the scope of
autonomy if the theory stays at the level of "thinness" that Fleming prefers.
By contrast, I think a "thick" theory would easily distinguish between
Lawrence v. Texas and the case of Armin Meiwes. The reason Lawrence
was rightly decided was that it protected a freedom that was worth
protecting.
Intimate relationships are important aspects of human
flourishing and well-being, and the government accordingly has an interest
in promoting a culture in which people are (and feel) free to enter into
relationships that are important for living good lives. No analogous
argument can be made about killing and eating a human being or being
killed and eaten. Fleming is correct to point out the importance of the
element of choice in intimate relations, meaning that there is an independent
value in choosing to enter into an intimate relationship as opposed to being
thrust into a relationship that one has not chosen, no matter how loving,
fulfilling, and meaningful that relationship may turn out to be. But in
valuing autonomy in that scenario, it would be a mistake to lose sight of the
value of the activity that is being chosen through one's exercise of
autonomy, and avoiding such a mistake need not lead one to overlook the
importance of autonomy altogether. It is unclear to me how the value of
autonomy can be enforced and appropriately limited without engaging in
these sorts of "thick" analyses.
At the same time, it is true that an argument that a "thick" analysis has to
be part of protecting the value of autonomy does not necessarily imply that
the federal judiciary is in the best position to engage in such analyses. But
would it not be better for the Court to openly admit the kinds of "thick"
analyses that are explicitly or implicitly going on in cases like Lawrence
and think in terms of how to balance the need to enforce constitutional
values and the need to devise judicially manageable tools to do so? I think

81. Id. at6.
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Fleming's theory of autonomy has room for these sorts of arguments, but, if
that is the case, can his theory be as "thin" as he prefers?
CONCLUSION

This essay has raised two questions having to do with Fleming's central
argument that autonomy is a core value that must be protected to "secure
constitutional democracy." First, if Fleming is correct about the place of
autonomy in our constitutional practice, can we make sense of the current
level of constitutional regulation of criminalization?
Second, in
understanding the scope of deliberative autonomy in constitutional law, can
we read the Constitution in a way that frees our constitutional practice from
making evaluative judgments about good and bad exercises of autonomy?
The answer I suggest for both questions is no.

